will be tightly held toserve the prince with fidelity； inasmuch as they know it to be verynecessary for them to cancel by deeds the bad impression which he hadformed of them； and thus the prince always extracts more profit fromthem than from those who； serving him in too much security； may neglecthis affairs。 And since the matter demands it； I must not fail to warn aprince； who by means of secret favours has acquired a new state； that hemust well consider the reasons which induced those to favour him who didso； and if it be not a natural affection towards him； but onlydiscontent with their government； then he will only keep them friendlywith great trouble and difficulty； for it will be impossible to satisfythem。 And weighing well the reasons for this in those examples which canbe taken from ancient and modern affairs； we shall find that it iseasier for the prince to make friends of those men who were contentedunder the former government； and are therefore his enemies； than ofthose who； being discontented with it； were favourable to him andencouraged him to seize it。6。 It has been a custom with princes； in order to hold their states moresecurely； to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit tothose who might design to work against them； and as a place of refugefrom a first attack。 I praise this system because it has been made useof formerly。 Notwithstanding that； Messer Nicolo Vitelli in our timeshas been seen to demolish two fortresses in Citta di Castello so th